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A GLOWING PROBLEM: NORTH COUNTY ST. LOUIS AND 
NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In 2010, Kevin Kamps, a nuclear waste activist, referred to 
the United States’ current waste storage strategies as the “single greatest 
security vulnerability in the United States.”1 While his statement may 
seem like hyperbole, there is the very real question of what threats nuclear 
waste poses in Kamps’ mind that justifies referring to it as such a threat 
repetitive. As nuclear waste spreads into Coldwater Creek from the West 
Lake Landfill in North St. Louis County (“North County”), the citizens of 
North County are experiencing a spike in cancer rates. The people of 
North County are certain that the cancer rates are due to the failure of a 
former nuclear refinery storing high-level radioactive waste in 
unacceptable conditions. If the improper storing of high-level radioactive 
waste is the cause of these cancer rates, it’s critical to discover who was 
responsible for monitoring waste storage when the waste was spilled. 
                                                 
1 Steve Hargreaves, Nuclear Waste: America’s ‘biggest security threat’, CNN MONEY 
(Apr. 1, 2011). http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/01/news/economy/nuclear_waste/. 
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More importantly, who is responsible for monitoring waste storage now, 
and what can they do to prevent this kind of contamination in the future? 
II. A GROWING PROBLEM IN NORTH COUNTY 
Twenty miles north of St. Louis, you can find the town of 
Bridgeton.2 In the summer, you will see the community gathering together 
for fireworks displays on the Fourth of July,3 and in the winter you can 
attend the local pancake breakfast with Santa.4 In these and other ways, 
Bridgeton is like any other small town you will find across Missouri. The 
major difference between Bridgeton and other Missouri towns is the West 
Lake landfill.5 While most landfills are filled with the refuse of modern 
life, the West Lake landfill contains an inordinate amount of hazardous 
nuclear waste left over from World War II.6 
                                                 
2 Missouri Department of 
Transportationhttp://www.modot.org/newsandinfo/documents/countymaps/st_louis.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2016). 
3 Special Events, CITY OF BRIDGETON MISSOURI. 
http://www.bridgetonmo.com/departments/parks-and-recreation/programs-
activities/special-events. 
4 City of Bridgeton Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 2016 Fall Activity Guide, 
http://www.bridgetonmo.com/home/showdocument?id=1594.  
5 Jeffery Tomic, EPA Weighs Cleanup of Nuclear Waste at Bridgeton Landfill, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/epa-weighs-
cleanup-of-nuclear-waste-at-bridgeton-landfill/article_452f82ac-6d57-11e1-9300-
0019bb30f31a.html. 
6 Blythe Bernhard, State Now Asks for Inquiry into North County Cancers, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Sep. 23, 2014) http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-
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The origin of the nuclear waste in the West Lake landfill stretches 
back to the creation of the first atom bomb.7 The Ireland-based company 
Mallinckrodt Chemical Inc. (“Mallinckrodt”) had one of its headquarters 
in St. Louis, Missouri during the height of the United States’ nuclear 
testing.8 Mallinckrodt signed a contract with the U.S. War Department9 to 
provide uranium to the University of Chicago’s graphite reactor.10 This 
relationship evolved into Mallinckrodt providing uranium processing and 
waste management for the United States’ first attempts at producing 
atomic weapons.11 Mallinckrodt was the only producer of uranium 
contracted with the federal government when the Manhattan Project 
initially began, so Mallinckrodt provided high purity uranium and handled 
the resulting waste.12 70 years after the completion of the Manhattan 
Project, Mallinckrodt’s relationship with the federal government 
                                                                                                                         
fit/health/state-now-asks-for-inquiry-into-north-county-cancers/article_f2de6a33-f482-
5d2a-9797-b7dd2f662ce1.html. 
7 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (hereafter “NRC”), Mallinckrodt Chemical Inc. 
http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/decommissioning/complex/mallinckrodt-chemical-inc-
facility.html (last updated June 26, 2015). 
8 Id. 
9 STEPHEN A. CAMBONE, The National Security Act of 1947– 26 July 1947, A New 
Structure for National Security Policy Planning, 228-32 (Washington, D.C.: CSIS1998).  




continued, and Mallinckrodt purified 45 million kilograms’ worth of 
uranium products.13 Mallinckrodt produced reactor fuel rods from 1956 to 
1961, which contributed to some of the country’s first nuclear reactors.14 
Mallinckrodt continued production of nuclear material, such as C-T and 
thorium salt, until 1993, when its license to handle nuclear materials was 
limited to decommissioning.15  
After the 1993 decommissioning license was issued, discussions 
began about where to dispose of Mallinckrodt’s more than half a century’s 
worth of nuclear waste.16 The United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (“NRC”) oversaw the use of the Mississippi River, the only 
surface water near the Mallinckrodt facility, as the method of eliminating 
the nuclear waste.17 However, decommissioning through the Mississippi 
River did not happen fast enough, and the surfaces, structures, and soil at 
the Mallinckrodt site became contaminated by the radioactive material.18 
The United States Army Corps of Engineers ( “Corps”), with oversight by 
                                                 
13 Keith Schneider, Mountain of Nuclear Waste Splits St. Louis and Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES  
(Mar. 24, 1990). http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/24/us/mountain-of-nuclear-waste-
splits-st-louis-and-suburbs-888.html. 




18 Bernhard, supra note 6. 
 79 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), was 
assigned to remove the contamination at the Mallinckrodt facilities.19 The 
Corps’ removal of the contamination came in two phases.20 Phase I 
involved the decommissioning of contaminated equipment and 
structures.21 Phase II involves decommissioning building slabs and 
foundations, paved surfaces, and all subsurface materials. While Phase I 
finished in December 2004, Phase II is ongoing.22 
While these operations to decontaminate the area around the 
Mallinckrodt facility are in progress, little has been done for the areas 
around St. Louis County where Mallinckrodt had secretly dumped tons of 
nuclear waste.23 One such dumping site was the West Lake landfill.24 
Another location, Coldwater Creek, was contaminated as well.25 The 
                                                 




23 Steven Hsieh, St. Louis Is Burning, ROLLING STONE (May 10, 2013),  
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/st-louis-is-burning-20130510. 
24 Id. 
25 Schneider, supra at note 13. (“Until 1966, Mallinckrodt processed uranium for nuclear 
weapons at its main plant along the Mississippi River in downtown St. Louis and in 
Weldon Spring, 25 miles to the west. Under the cover of national security secrecy, the 
Government authorized the company to dump radioactive wastes quietly in the suburbs, 
including a 21-acre Berkeley field owned by St. Louis. It is that field and the 61-acre park 
across the street that the Government is considering for a permanent storage site.”). 
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Corps has begun a cleanup project at Coldwater Creek,26 and, in 2008, the 
EPA announced a plan to clean up the West Lake landfill.27 
The health and safety of the people of Bridgeton and all of North 
St. Louis County are relying on the EPA’s cleanup plans. Unfortunately, 
in 2012, four years after the announcement of the EPA’s plan, the cleanup 
still has not remedied the issue of nuclear waste contamination around the 
West Lake landfill.28 The people in North St. Louis County began noticing 
the prevalence of cancer among the residents of the North County.29 A 
2013 investigation by the Missouri Department of Health and Senior 
Services determined that the cancer rates were not anomalous, and were 
not likely linked to the radiation in the area.30 The report was criticized by 
citizens of North County for flaws in methodology, including failing to 
                                                 
26U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program, 
http://www.mvs.usace.army.mil/Missions/CentersofExpertise/FormerlyUtilizedSitesRem
edialActionProgram.aspx. 
27 Tomic, supra note 5.  
28 Id. 
29 Blythe Bernhard, North St. Louis County Cancer Report Called Flawed, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/north-st-
louis-county-cancer-report-called-flawed/article_0e66e0ab-b25a-5a37-a2ae-
276dd2073693.html. 
30Shumei Yun, et al., MO. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SENIOR SERV., Analysis of Cancer 
Incidence Data in Coldwater Creek Area, 1996-2004 (Mar. 2013), 
http://health.mo.gov/living/healthcondiseases/chronic/cancerinquiry/pdf/ccanalysis.pdf. 
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account for people who had moved away from North St. Louis County.31 
After much demand, a subsequent investigation was conducted in 2015, 
which showed that there were statistically significant increases in 
leukemia, breast, colon, brain, and other cancer rates in areas around 
Coldwater Creek and Bridgeton.32 The Missouri Department of Health and 
Senior Services is now requesting assistance from the Centers for Disease 
Control (“CDC”) in determining if the nuclear waste caused the increased 
cancer rates.33  
Numerous residents of North County have initiated lawsuits 
against Mallinckrodt for dumping the nuclear waste in Coldwater Creek 
and the West Lake landfill.34 Mallinckrodt responded to these lawsuits by 
                                                 
31 Bernhard, supra note 29.  
32 Shumei Yun, et al., MO. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SENIOR SERV., Analysis of Cancer 




33 Bernhard, supra note 6.  
34 Blythe Bernhard, Another Lawsuit Claims Cancers Caused by Coldwater Creek in 
North St. Louis County, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sep. 8, 2014) 
http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/health/another-lawsuit-claims-cancers-
caused-by-coldwater-creek-in-north/article_d3931a27-7520-5ad2-bf17-
583c0a19c049.html; see also Blythe Bernhard, North St. Louis County Group Files 2nd 
Suit Alleging Nuclear Waste Caused Illness, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 11, 2012) 
http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/fitness/north-st-louis-county-group-
files-nd-suit-alleging-nuclear/article_1dc41bd3-b72a-5736-abe5-3609f8288d74.html; see 
also Blythe Bernhard, Judge Throws Out Most Coldwater Creek Cancer Claims, ST. 
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saying that the business was complying with federal law when disposing 
of the nuclear waste.35 
III. HISTORY OF REGULATORY LAWS REGARDING NUCLEAR WASTE 
A. State Nuclear Waste Law 
Missouri lacks laws and regulations regarding the disposal of solid 
nuclear waste. The only law regarding hazardous waste in Missouri is the 
Missouri Hazardous Waste Management Law (“Waste Law”).36 The 
topics covered by the Waste Law range from required licensing for 
hazardous waste transporters37 to the establishment of taxes on waste 
entering landfills.38 However, Section 260.355.1 of the Waste Law makes 
it clear that Missouri does not intend to regulate high-level radioactive 
waste.39 Specifically, the section specifies that the Waste Law applies to 
waste except for a few categories, including “[r]adioactive wastes 
                                                                                                                         
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 29, 2013) http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-
fit/health/judge-throws-out-most-coldwater-creek-cancer-claims/article_1101cc0c-7185-
534f-89ff-870a322ff042.html (Claims for injuries relating to nuclear materials was not 
dismissed). 
35 Id. 
36 MO. REV. STAT. § 250.350.1 (2000). 
37 § 260.385.1.  
38 § 260.390.1.  
39 § 260.355.1.   
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regulated under section 2011, et seq., of title 42 of United States Code.”40 
The relevant federal statute regulates “high-level” radioactive waste,41 
which is defined as “the highly radioactive material resulting from the 
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced 
directly in reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid 
waste that contains fission products in sufficient concentrations,” as well 
as “other highly radioactive material that the [Nuclear Regulatory] 
Commission, consistent with existing law, determines by rule requires 
permanent isolation.”42 While this definition makes it clear that Missouri 
has no intention to deal with high-level radioactive waste, it suggests that 
Missouri’s Waste Law does cover low-level radioactive waste.  
Missouri is willing to regulate “low-level” radioactive waste as 
defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (“NRC”) identifies low-level waste as objects that are 
tangential to the processing of nuclear material, rather than the runoff of 
the fission material itself.43 The NRC identified examples of such “low-
                                                 
40 § 260.355.1 (1). 
41 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b)(dd)-(gg)(2012). 
42 § 10101.  
43 NRC, Low-Level Waste (Last Updated Jun. 21, 2016). http://www.nrc.gov/waste/low-
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level” waste materials as “contaminated protective shoe covers and 
clothing, wiping rags, … syringes, and laboratory animal carcasses and 
tissues.”44 To control these materials, the Waste Law created the 
Hazardous Waste Management Commission of the State of Missouri 
(“Commission”).45 The Commission has the power to impose inspection 
schedules on hazardous waste production facilities, as well as to establish 
a tax on any facilities that are required to receive hazardous waste and the 
facilities that generate the waste.46 The Commission can also establish 
regulations on the storage, treatment, and disposal of low-level radioactive 
hazardous wastes.47  
However, none of these regulations affects high-level radioactive 
material, such as the waste produced by Mallinckrodt, because Missouri 
has no laws regulating high-level radioactive waste. However, this lack of 
regulation is not uncommon amongst the states.48 Most states have laws 
either admonishing certain actions, or laws used to review federal 
                                                                                                                         
level-waste.html. 
44 Id. 
45 MO. REV. STAT. § 260.365.1 (2000). 
46 § 260.370.1; see also. § 260.380.1. 
47 §§ 260.370(2), (3)(b), (g); see also §§ 260.380(4), (7). 
48 S. Haber, State Nuclear Legislative Report, ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC., (1981). 
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recommendations.49 This lack of regulation of high-level radioactive waste 
is due, in part, to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 50 
B. Federal Nuclear Waste Law Prior to 1974 
The first major federal law covering nuclear waste was the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946 (“the Act”). The legislation was developed after 
Manhattan Project participants called for a comprehensive nuclear energy 
program that referenced the military, scientific, and industrial uses of 
nuclear energy.51 After significant revision and debate about the threat of 
nuclear weapon technology leaking out of the United States, President 
Harry S. Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 on August 1, 
1946.52 This new legislation gave broad power to the federal government 
regarding the ownership and development of nuclear technology.53 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created the Atomic Energy 
Commission in order to develop regulations and make determinations of 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 James Nuse, Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Congress), AEC 
HEADQUARTERS LIBRARY 
http://science.energy.gov/~/media/bes/pdf/Atomic_Energy_Act_of_1946.pdf (This is a 
selected excerpt of the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, including its 
relevant provisions). 
51 RICHARD HEWLETT & OSCAR ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC 
ENERGY COMMISSION: THE NEW WORLD, 1939/1946 VOL. 1. 410 (1962).  
52 VINCENT JAMES, MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB 578 (1985). 
53 Hewlett & Anderson, supra note 51.   
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federal law regarding how nuclear power ought to be handled.54 The Act 
gave the Atomic Energy Commission sole power to authorize and make 
arrangements for the research and development of any process relating to 
nuclear processes, even those relating to protecting the health of 
individuals during research and production.55 Most interestingly, the 
Atomic Energy Act made all nuclear fission materials within the United 
States the property of the federal government.56 Additionally, Section 9 of 
the Act gave the Atomic Energy Commission ownership of all property 
rights the federal government had in any nuclear materials.57 The Atomic 
Energy Commission was given full control over dissemination of all 
nuclear materials and any information relating to production of nuclear 
energy.58  
In the years following the signing of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946, the Atomic Energy Commission retained control over all things 
regarding nuclear energy. Laws subsequent to the 1946 Act established 
that states had the ability to enter into agreements with the Commission 
                                                 
54 Nuse, supra note 50, at § 2.  
55 Id. at § 4. 
56 Id. at § 5. 
57 Id. at §. 9. 
58 Id. at §§ 10–12. 
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regarding a limited set of subjects.59 However, no agreement could remove 
the authority of the Commission regarding disposal of any nuclear 
material or byproduct thereof.60 Later laws even required states to dispose 
of low-level radioactive waste themselves.61 Through all of this, control 
over high-level radioactive waste and materials remained in the hands of 
the Atomic Energy Commission.62 
C. Federal Nuclear Waste Law After 1974: The Birth of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
 
Criticism of the Atomic Energy Commission grew leading into the 
creation of the Energy Reorganization Act.63 The Atomic Energy 
Commission was accused of being negligent while performing 
atmospheric testing, causing numerous individuals living near the testing 
areas to develop health problems.64 By the 1960s, atmospheric testing, 
such as the tests conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission, left the 
world in a damaged state.65 From small St. Louis County towns to 
                                                 
59 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (2012). 
60 § 2021(c). 
61 Id. 
62 Nuse, supra note 50. 
63 GLENN SEABORG, THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION UNDER NIXON 115 (1993). 
64 Id. 
65 Steven Simon, Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests and Cancer Risks, AMERICAN 
SCIENTIST (last visited Nov. 28, 2016), 
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Antarctica, soil, water, and polar ice showed signs of atmospheric nuclear 
testing.66 Citizens blamed the Atomic Energy Commission for creating 
what they viewed as a nuclear fallout from the Atomic Energy 
Commission’s atmospheric testing.67  
The actions of the Atomic Energy Commission prompted a 
legislative response in the form of the Energy Reorganization Act of 
1974.68 Section 104 of the Energy Reorganization Act officially abolished 
the Atomic Energy Commission.69 All of the funds and many of the 
powers of the Commission were transferred to the Energy Research and 
Development Administration.70 The Energy Reorganization Act also 
created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”).71 Rather than being 
given a wide grant of power of the handling of nuclear material, the NRC 
was required to establish four offices for handling specific issues 




67 Seaborg, supra note 63. 
68  NRC, Nuclear Regulatory Legislation 112th Congress; 2nd Session (Last Visited Apr. 
10, 2016) § 2 http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1327/ML13274A489.pdf#page=241. 
69 Id. at § 104. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at § 201. 
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regarding nuclear technology.72 The NRC consists of five individuals, one 
of whom serves as the Chairman when selected to do so by the President 
of the United States.73 The four remaining members of the NRC direct 
these four different offices.74  
One NRC office was responsible for licensing nuclear research 
facilities, high-level radioactive waste storage facilities, and nuclear 
reactor facilities.75 Another NRC office handles nuclear regulatory 
research, much like the Atomic Energy Commission handled nuclear 
research.76 However, rather than being able to research any topic regarding 
nuclear power, the NRC is limited to research “which the Commission 
deems necessary for the performance of its licensing and related 
regulatory functions.”77 While this limitation still gives the Commission 
the ability to determine what research is necessary, it limits the potential 
research by forcing it to be related to “licensing and related regulatory 
functions.”78  
                                                 
72 Id. at §§ 202-05. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at § 202. 
76 Id. at § 205. 
77 Id. at § 205(b)(2). 
78 Id. 
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The remaining two divisions of the NRC both deal specifically 
with managing nuclear waste. One of these divisions is the Office of 
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.79 This office handles the 
principal licensing and regulation of all processing, transportation, and 
handling of nuclear materials.80 This office also oversees the protection of 
nuclear material to prevent sabotage or theft.81 The Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation also manages nuclear waste.82 The Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation is responsible for licensing the construction and 
operation of facilities to house nuclear reactors.83 Further, the Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation is responsible for reviewing the safety and 
safeguards of reactors, including evaluating methods of transporting and 
storing high-level radioactive waste to prevent hazards to employees and 
the general public when storing the waste at a reactor site.84  
While this legislation gave the NRC the full discretion to establish 
any oversight and regulation it felt necessary, no legislation was ever 
passed to establish specific requirements of these programs or 
                                                 
79 Id. at § 204. 
80 Id. at § 204(b)(1). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at § 203. 
83 Id. at § 203(b)(1). 
84 Id. at § 203(b)(2)(B). 
 91 
punishments for facilities failing to meet the programs’ requirements. 
However, legislation after the creation of the NRC did detail the 
requirements for high-level radioactive waste storage facilities.  
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 set the standard for how 
nuclear waste in the United States ought to be handled.85 Much of the Act 
was designed to approve and develop a high-level radioactive waste 
repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada.86 The process included the 
submission of environmental impact statements regarding storage at 
Yucca Mountain,87 providing financial assistance to Nevada for 
development,88 and planning for the phase-out of all high-level nuclear 
waste sites other than Yucca Mountain.89 The official construction license 
application for a repository at Yucca Mountain was not filed until 2008.90 
The Act also developed the Interim Storage Program.91 The 
purpose of this program was to provide for the storage of spent high-level 
                                                 
85 42 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012).  
86 Id. 
87 NRC, supra note 68 at § 114(f). 
88 Id. at § 116(c). 
89 Id. at § 160. 
90 NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, Repository Development (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) 
http://www.nei.org/issues-policy/nuclear-waste-management/disposal. 
91 NRC, supra note 68, at § 131.  
 92 
radioactive waste at facilities owned by the Federal Government.92 The 
Act specifically identifies civilian nuclear power reactors as being proper 
storage locations, and requires the NRC to develop procedures for 
licensing these locations as storage sites.93 States that house facilities 
selected to serve as interim storage facilities have the opportunity to 
participate throughout all parts of the process of developing the site.94 If 
the federal government attempts to store more than 300 metric tons of 
waste at any one site, the corresponding state has the opportunity to file a 
Notice of Disapproval before Congress.95 Interestingly, there does not 
seem to be any section allowing a state to choose not to go through with 
the resolution process and simply refuse the construction of the storage 
facility. Perhaps this is because this provision of the Act is designed to 
create temporary storage, while the waste waits to be sent to Yucca 
Mountain—the selected permanent high-level nuclear waste storage site.96  
In 2010, President Barack Obama stopped the Yucca Mountain 
license review and instead empaneled a study to create a better long-term 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at § 133.  
94 Id. at § 135(d). 
95 Id. at § 125(d)(6)(B). 
96 Id. at § 133. 
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storage system.97 While research and strategies have been developed on 
how to handle high-level nuclear waste,98 nothing has yet been 
implemented. This decision has effectively turned what were once 
temporary storage facilities into permanent storage.  
VI. COMMENT: SOLUTION 
North County St. Louis is just one example of recent incidents 
where groundwater has been contaminated by nuclear radiation. On 
February 6, 2016, the Indian Point Nuclear Facility in New York reported 
a leak of tritium-contaminated water that reached the groundwater around 
the facility.99 From that leak, one monitoring well reported a 65,000% 
increase in radioactivity.100 Indian Point Nuclear Facility is one of many 
reactors that have had incidents of radiation leaks in the past decade due to 
onsite storage of nuclear waste or spent nuclear fuel.101 The United States 
                                                 
97 NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, supra at note 90. 
98 U.S.DEP’T OF ENERGY, Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear 




99 Andrew M. Cuomo, Statement from Governor Andrew M. Cuomo Regarding Indian 




101 See Jennifer Hoar, Tenn. Nuke Accident Hidden from Public, CBS NEWS (Aug. 21, 
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is in dire need of a new system of monitoring these facilities containing 
nuclear waste. The solution to this problem comes in three steps: (1) create 
interim storage sites for nuclear waste; (2) open Yukka Mountain and 
begin looking for other geological deposits; and (3) increase the NRC’s 
oversight of nuclear waste storage sites.  
A. Step One: Create Interim Storage Sites 
Currently, the majority of spent nuclear fuel is stored onsite at 
nuclear reactor facilities.102  
Storage at these facilities has been improving in recent years, 
leading to the development of sophisticated systems of storage of spent 
nuclear fuel in water-filled pools.103 However, space at nuclear reactor 
facilities is limited and growing scarce as more spent nuclear fuel is 
developed at those reactor sites.104 The cost of such storage is, in part, 
passed along to the users of nuclear electricity at a tenth of one cent per 
                                                                                                                         
2007). http://www.cbsnews.com/news/tenn-nuke-accident-hidden-from-public/; see also 
Michael Hawthorn, Exelon to Pay $1 Million to Settle Suits Over Leaks at Power Plants, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 12, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-03-
12/business/ct-biz-0312-exelon-leak-settlement-20100312_1_exelon-nuclear-tritium-
leaks. 




kilowatt hour used.105 The rest of the cost is borne by United States 
taxpayers after the United States failed to remove waste from temporary 
reactor storage facilities in 1998, causing many of those facilities to seek 
damages from the United States, as well as further compensation.106 
Compensation for those facilities has already accumulated a cost of nearly 
2 billion dollars, and is anticipated to reach 20 billion dollars by 2020.107 
Due to the limited space and cost of onsite storage, the Nuclear Energy 
Institute recommends the creation of locations outside of nuclear reactors 
to store the spent nuclear fuel.108 
The Nuclear Energy Institute is not the only organization vying for 
the creation of offsite storage. In 2013, the United States Department of 
Energy made a number of recommendations for handling the disposal of 
used nuclear fuel and waste.109 One of the highlighted points of these 
recommendations was the creation of “consent-based interim storage 
                                                 
105 Eugene Voiland, Disposal of High Level Nuclear Waste, CENTER FOR REACTOR 
INFORMATION (May 2002), 
http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0205voiland.html. 
106 Hoar, supra note 101. 
107 NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, supra note 90. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
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facilities.”110 These facilities would be created via an agreement with the 
federal government.111 The federal government would make agreements 
with the host communities and landowners for when the waste would be 
removed from their community and how their community would be 
compensated for storage of the waste.112 These consent-based interim 
storage facilities, as their name suggests, would be temporary solutions 
until the federal government created consolidated interim storage facilities 
with greater storage capacity as well as more opportunity for disposal.113 
Unfortunately, there is a legislative roadblock in the way of opening such 
interim storage sites.  
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments Act of 1987 
(“NWPA”) added a number of sections defining the selection and 
construction of storage sites. Under the NWPA, the selection of a 
temporary storage site (identified in the statute as “monitored retrievable 
storage”)114 is not allowed until a repository has been selected and sent to 
                                                 
110 Id. at 5. 
111 Id. at 6. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 42 U.S.C. § 10161 (2012). 
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the president for approval.115 While other sites have been examined,116 the 
only repository being considered by the federal government is the Yucca 
Mountain geological repository. In order to proceed with the construction 
of these interim storage facilities, Yucca Mountain must be approved and 
licensed. 
B. Step Two: Open Yucca Mountain 
The Yucca Mountain repository’s construction was prevented in 
2010 when President Barack Obama halted the licensing review of the 
storage site.117 The Obama Administration called for further 
environmental research to be conducted into the viability of the site.118 
The NRC was called on to create a supplement to the environmental 
impact statement prepared by the Department of Energy in regards to the 
creation of the Yucca Mountain repository.119 The NRC published its 
supplement in November 2015, finding that any environmental impact 
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116 Keith Rogers, Shale Sites Studied as Possible Alterative to Yucca Mountain, LAS 
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from the creation of the site would be small.120 While this most recent 
report, like those before it, suggests Yucca Mountain is a valid site for a 
waste storage facility, no further developments have been made on the 
construction of the site. 
Despite these studies, opponents of the Yucca Mountain site 
continue to deny the site’s viability. Nevada argues that the Yucca 
Mountain site is unsuitable for nuclear waste storage.121 The state argues 
that storing nuclear waste in Yucca Mountain is a dangerous proposition 
because of the possibility of earthquakes and volcanism,122 as Yucca 
Mountain is located in a volcanic tuff and lies above a large volcanic 
aquifer in Death Valley.123 However, the Department of Energy has 
identified the chances of volcanic activity affecting the repository to be 
nonexistent.124 The Nuclear Energy Institute also points out that 
                                                 
120 NRC, Supplement to the U.S. Department of Energy’s Environmental Impact 
Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-
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121 YUCCAMOUNTAIN.ORG, FAQ’S (last updated Jan. 2, 2016), 
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122 Id. 
123 NRC, supra note 120 at 2-6. 
124 YUCCAMOUNTAIN.ORG, supra note 121. 
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earthquakes decrease in impact further underground.125 The Yucca 
Mountain repository will be 1,000 feet underground in a block designed to 
withstand severe earthquakes.126  
Other opponents argue that there is evidence of groundwater 
upwelling at Yucca Mountain, which could lead to the waste 
contaminating groundwater or even causing explosions.127 In combating 
this line of argument, the Nuclear Energy Institute researched the 
groundwater basin below Yucca Mountain and found that “[t]he fraction 
of an inch of water that seeps through fractures in the rock eventually 
reaches a groundwater basin beneath the mountain that is completely 
close[ed].” This water does not flow to any river or ocean or to the 
aquifers that provide a major source of drinking water.128 Further 
disproving the upwelling argument, the National Academy of Sciences, 
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127 NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICES, Why Yucca Mountain Will Fail as 
a Nuclear Waste Repository (last visited Apr. 10, 2016), 
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University of Nevada at Las Vegas, Nuclear Waste Technical Review 
Board, and United States Geological Survey have all studied the 
possibility of upwelling and have concluded that upwelling has never 
occurred at the Yucca Mountain site.129 
Every formal study by the Department of Energy or the NRC 
relating to Yucca Mountain has come back approving of the repositories 
safety and viability as a repository for spent nuclear fuel.130 Beyond that, 
the most recent statute regarding the development of a candidate site for a 
repository identifies Yucca Mountain as the only viable location.131 Any 
further delay only increases the chances of yet another environmental 
catastrophe from storing nuclear waste onsite at nuclear reactors. In order 
to further the country’s nuclear safety, it is critical that the United States 
Federal Government approve the use of Yucca Mountain. After approving 
Yucca Mountain, the government will be able to construct the interim 
storage facilities and transport waste from the waste’s current, 
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America’s Nuclear Future approved Yucca Mountain); see also, NRC supra note 120 
(Supplemental report published by the NRC approved of Yucca Mountain as a repository 
site in response to a DOE report approving the site); see also WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS 
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decentralized locations. If the government adheres to the Department of 
Energy’s strategy for the development of a geologic repository, Yucca 
Mountain would be set to open by 2048;132 thus, allowing the government 
to move waste from the interim storage to permanent storage where it 
cannot do any harm to the public. However, all of these changes will 
require a drastic shift in the regulation of nuclear waste. 
C. STEP THREE: EXPANDING REGULATION 
As discussed in the Legal Background section above, the NRC has 
a significant oversight program for inspecting reactor sites.133 Regional 
inspectors perform between 10 and 25 inspections per year, focusing on 
areas such as fire protection, emergency planning, radiation protection, 
equipment testing, and134 spent fuel storage.135 However, there is no direct 
oversight program for inspecting high-level or low-level radioactive waste 
storage facilities.  
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This lack of clear oversight procedures for nuclear waste storage is 
severely problematic in light of regulations requiring NRC inspections.136 
The regulation repeatedly references licensees as being subject to 
oversight by the NRC137 Specifically, the regulation identifies “A license 
issued under the regulations in parts . . . 61, [and] 63 . . . of this chapter,” 
as being subject to the demands of the NRC.138 Sections 61 and 63 
specifically identify land disposal of radioactive waste and disposal at 
Yucca Mountain.139 Thus, implying that the NRC has a duty to inspect 
waste storage sites just as they inspect reactors. To abide by this 
regulation, the NRC will need to expand its oversight programs. 
Luckily, by creating centralized interim storage locations, as well 
as opening Yucca Mountain, the number of locations requiring inspection 
will drastically decrease. Rather than having storage across multiple 
reactors in 34 separate states,140 the United States could limit the number 
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to just those locations selected for interim or permanent waste storage. The 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards could take on this 
additional oversight program to ensure the safety of these storage 
locations. Unfortunately, President Obama called for a major decrease in 
funding to the NRC, which may make this added oversight implausible.141 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The woes of North County St. Louis seem never-ending. In 
December 2015, the Army Corps of Engineers identified seven more sites 
along Clear Water Creek, the creek believed to have been contaminated by 
Mallinkrodt, which are considered “waste hot spots.”142 Additionally, fire 
officials have identified an underground fire that is getting dangerously 
close to yet more radioactive waste stored near the West Lake Landfill in 
Bridgeton.143 While the cleanup of the contamination in North County 
continues, the need for change concerning nuclear waste and spent nuclear 
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fuel storage grows ever more pressing. The lack of clear oversight of high-
level radioactive waste storage outside of reactor facilities, the perpetuity 
of the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel on reactor sites, and the 
seeming halt to the construction of any consolidated nuclear storage site 
are all contributing to the broken nuclear waste policy.  
However, there are clear solutions. After numerous research 
efforts, Yucca Mountain has been determined to be a viable permanent 
storage location. Approving further construction at Yucca Mountain to 
eventually open it as a permanent geologic repository for nuclear waste is 
a critical element of the solution to the United States’ waste storage 
problems. Opening Yucca Mountain will take many years, making it 
necessary to open interim storage facilities in safe locations with the 
approval of the surrounding communities. These first two steps would 
greatly decrease the strain on the NRC’s oversight team, allowing them to 
only examine a limited number of interim storage facilities and Yucca 
Mountain. These interim facilities allow the NRC to combine the storage 
of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, stretching the 
NRC’s strict spent nuclear fuel oversight program to waste storage as well. 
These may seem like drastic steps, but the severity of the impact pales in 
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comparison to the steps being taken in North County St. Louis, which are 
a direct consequence of not acting sooner.  
JASON HORNE 
 


